[time 188] Re: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time

Hitoshi Kitada (hitoshi@kitada.com)
Tue, 6 Apr 1999 19:59:30 +0900

Dear Stephen,

I try to clarify my position.

>From the conlusion, I agree that gravitaion will be given a QM formalism, but
it will be at the last step of my approach.

What I am trying to understand is the machinery or structure of our
recognition with the expectation that it will clarify physical aspect of
gravity. In this point, I think your approach has the same goal, or you will
get to it at least as some byproducts. However, I think it necessary to
understand the fundamental structure of observation first.

I feel you seem to try to get at once the QM theory of gravity, seeing that
you are interested in Weyl's approach. On the other hand, seeing that you seem
to think that interactions as communications are important, Weyl's approach
looks to me slightly different from what you want to understand in terms of
information theoretic approach. I do not see what approach you try to take
toward QG.

Best wishes,

----- Original Message -----
From: Stephen P. King <stephenk1@home.com>
To: Hitoshi Kitada <hitoshi@kitada.com>
Cc: Time List <time@kitada.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 1999 4:37 PM
Subject: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time

> Dear Hitoshi,
> You are correct but I am not explaining myself clearly. I cut
> and pasted your post together...
> Hitoshi Kitada wrote:
> >
> > Dear Stephen,
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Hitoshi Kitada <hitoshi@kitada.com>
> > To: Hitoshi Kitada <hitoshi@kitada.com>; Stephen P. King
> > Sent: Monday, April 05, 1999 2:22 PM
> > Subject: Re: Prugovecki's time
> > >
> > > Dear Stephen,
> > >
> > >I in a sense agree with Prugovecki, in that, at observation, the clocks
> > >synchronize among local systems. My assumption that local systems are
> > >independent is valid only before doing observation. When one is doing
> > >observation, the world is classical for him, and time synchronizes and
> > >constructs usual image of the world. Thus if we want to see just the
> > >world at any time, Prugovecki's description would coincide with mine.
> His work is amazing in its scope!
> > >I think you seem to have misunderstood this point. The connections appear
> > >the observation. The assumption that local systems metrics are not
> > >is concerned only with the stage when one is inside the local system, the
> > >system local currently for him/her/it.
> > >In this sense, subjectivity is important in my formulation. It
> > >the local system in itself and the local systems among other LSs.
> I agree, prior to an observation, an LS is everything and nothing, thus
> I think of it as a balloon full of noise. Interestingly, Prugovecki's
> use of stochastical exitons is parallel to this idea. I am thinking
> farther about how LSs synchronize during the process of an observation.
> There is, I believe, an interrogatory sequence that "selects" the
> particular clocks that become synchronous.
> We must not assume that the act of synchronization between LS clocks
> occurs in one indivisible step for all LSs involved. I am sure that
> there is at least one LS A clock involved that observes the convergence
> in on step, but it is special. I believe it would act as a center of
> mass for the system of interacting LSs as seen by another LS B that
> observes the entire cluster of LSs as one LS, e.g. it observes a center
> of mass that corresponds to A.
> Think of how we communicate our ideas with each other. It takes several
> back and forth posts to "home in" on the essence. This is even more
> obvious when two LSs have different languages. When we find an idea or
> sound or object or any concrete entity in common, we use it as a
> pivoting point for further communications. It is here that I think that
> Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions and my talk of tournaments and
> gossiping. I apologize for being so metaphorical... :)
> > >I do not think Weyl's idea is crazy. The notion of gauge is a very normal
> > >extension of what was known at the age about electromagnetic field and
> > >gravitational field. The general gauge fields follow then naturally. I
> > >the approach recent physics has been taking based on this method is too
> > >and simple. It is as if there were no other ways of seeing the world. The
> > >notion of gauge is just a simple _mathematical and formal_ extension of
> > >the age knew. It is based on an observation of formal similarity between
> > >gravitational and electromagnetic fields. But I think there is a crucial
> > >difference between them as I have stated many times: Gravitation is
> > >and electronic forces are quantum mechanical. This is the basis of my
> I hope we can spend a little time going over Eddington's review of
> Weyl... :) I meant "crazy enough to possibly be true".
> > >In addition to this, even in formal similarity between the two, there is
> > >crucial difference between the gravitation and other gauge fields, which
> > >been preventing physicists from quantizing GR.
> > >
> > >By these points, my opinion is that gravitation and other gauge fields
> > >different at the essential level.
> Are you willing to consider the possibility that both gravity and EMF
> have both QM and GR aspects? When I speak of electromagnetic fields as
> classical I am thinking of the propagation of light rays, the infamous
> light cone structures that form the fabric that gravity wraps and
> weaves. The emission and absorption of EMF photons and gravitons can be
> modeled well as occurring internal to the LS. Gravitons pose a
> difficulty be cause one is unaccustomed to separating the "information"
> content of a gravitational field from its matter/geometry. It is the
> information about the metric, scale, clock and ordering that gravitons
> communicate internal to the LS, there is no actual "motion" of the type
> that we see of rigid bodies, no, this is very subtle, information is not
> matter. Think of how many way there are to describe the same idea, and
> how many ways there are of physically communicating a bit string. We can
> *not* form a unique and exclusive one to one isomorphism between an
> arbitrary bit of information and a particle of matter, we can only
> identify mappings between the equivalence classes of each. this is
> discussed well by Peter...
> I know that this may be a very strange line of thinking and I may just
> be very wrong! :) But could we try it out?
> > > In this sense, subjectivity is important in my formulation. It
> > > the local system in itself and the local systems among other LSs.
> Yes, Peter and I discussed this for a while. It appears that the
> subject-object relation is symmetrical. There is a wonderful thing that
> happens when we consider an LS as a subject as a singleton set A and the
> other LSs that it is near to as the singleton's complement A^c. If we
> think of A^c as a finite number of LSs that can somehow be reduced to a
> singleton by some particular observation by A, by symmetry, would we not
> expect that A becomes many neighboring yet distinct LSs? As one fuses,
> the other fissions, many -> one | one-> many ... Does this make sense?
> There exists a mathematical way of saying this but I do not remember it
> now. :(
> I do think that you and Ben speak to something along these lines in
> [Time 185] discussing how consciousness is always unified.
> [HK]
> > Further, Consciousness of the observer gives the QM nature of the observed
> > local system a classical nature as you describe:
> [BG]
> > In more modern language, what quantum physics tells us is that an event
> > not become <b>definite</b> until someone observes it. An unobserved
> > system remains in an uncertain state, a superposition of many different
> > possibilities. Observation causes "collapse" into a definite condition,
> > is chosen <b>at random</b> from among the possibilities provided. This
> > peculiar but well-established
> > empirical fact makes it natural to associate <b>consciousness</b> with
> > <b>quantum measurement</b> (Wigner, 1962; London and Bauer, 1983; Goswami,
> > 1990).<p>
> It is this "becoming definite" that is a computational action. But I
> disagree with Ben that [observations are just] "chosen <b>at random</b>
> from among the possibilities provided". There is both randomness and
> order. Look at the Surprise 20 questions game. The questions and answers
> are random but constrained to be logically consistent with all previous
> questions and answers. Here we have a chaining of logical inference that
> *can not be assumed to exist a priori*. This is at the heart of Pratt
> and Peter's thinking.
> > In this point, Ben's analysis of subjective consciousness is important for
> > standpoint.
> >
> > Best wishes,
> > Hitoshi
> Ben's work is very valuable to this effort! :) I am so happy he has a
> common goal with us.
> Onward,
> Stephen

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