Hitoshi Kitada (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Wed, 7 Apr 1999 01:28:53 +0900
----- Original Message -----
From: Stephen P. King <email@example.com>
To: Time List <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 1999 11:58 PM
Subject: [time 189] Re: [time 188] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time
> Dear Hitoshi,
> Perhaps we are both tired. :) I will wait to go over my ideas of QM
> gravity when we both have Eddington's paper on Weyl in hand. I again
> agree with what you are saying below. We are not converging here, it is
> obvious that I am just making noise.
> Hitoshi Kitada wrote:
> > Dear Stephen,
> > I try to clarify my position.
> > >From the conlusion, I agree that gravitaion will be given a QM formalism,
> > it will be at the last step of my approach.
> > What I am trying to understand is the machinery or structure of our
> > recognition with the expectation that it will clarify physical aspect of
> > gravity. In this point, I think your approach has the same goal, or you
> > get to it at least as some byproducts. However, I think it necessary to
> > understand the fundamental structure of observation first.
> I am known to be impatient... :)
> > I feel you seem to try to get at once the QM theory of gravity, seeing
> > you are interested in Weyl's approach. On the other hand, seeing that you
> > to think that interactions as communications are important, Weyl's
> > looks to me slightly different from what you want to understand in terms
> > information theoretic approach. I do not see what approach you try to take
> > toward QG.
> It is the same as your in the sense of equivalence. Note that how we
> think of a theory is also subject to the axioms of LS theory, and our
> minds are independent LSs. :)
Is your intention to explain everything? If so, I have to say "I think it is
> > Best wishes,
> > Hitoshi
> Can we look at what I wrote more carefully? How does one think of the
> observations occuring between subLSs when one is only observing the
> outside of that LS. Perhaps I am asking a question similar to Ben's:
> > Doesn't it violate common sense in some way -- i.e. if particles in
> > locations have interacted before, they may be correlated in their patterns
> > movement even when you subtract off the center of mass.
> >You are right:
> >The particles are correlated in their patterns of "movement." But it is so,
> >_as far as_ they are considered to "move" according to the "time" of the
> >system to which the particles belong. In other words, the reference frame
> >the "movement" is the space-time of the system. The "before" in the above
> >quotation of your opinion should thus be understood the "before" measured
> >the frame of this "time" of the system. Namely space-time is proper to each
> >local system. This is the first point.
> Do we say that there is a spacetime proper to *each* LS and,
> symmetrically, an LS proper to each spacetime?
There is no symmetry between LS and space-time at least in LS theory. LS
theory assumes the existence of space-time for each LS. Probably, the problem
you raise here is that we have a common space-time. My point in LS theory is
that that is only an assumption that cannot be verified, and that it is a
thing that we assume. This is the reason why I impose axioms 4 and 5. This
assumption remedies people from their "common" universe being chaos. But note
that, at the deepest level, there is no assurance that we can have a "common"
This is another way of
> saying that for every "subject" there is an "object" and for every
> "object" there is a "subject".
There are many objects for every LS.
> >Second, here is another implicit assumption. The particles' "correlation"
> >cannot be known unless the correlation is observed or measured. If no one
> >observes the system, the correlation cannot be known, or is forgotten. The
> >forgotten correlation cannot be traced further. One needs to start to
> >other systems similar to that one, in order to reproduce the observation.
> >sense, the word "observation" has an implicit assumption behind it that the
> >_different_ observations could be identified if one's memory tells one that
> >the situation looks the same as before ("before" in the time coordinate of
> >one's, and "one" can be a set of observers, e.g., a set of modern
> >that has a time coordinate which might have begun in the 16th century or so
> >(with Galileo Galilei and/or others?)).
> Could it be that the act of measurement/observation *is* a mapping of
Mapping from where to where? Namely what are the domain and range of your
like Edelman's idea that re-entrant mappings between
> neuronal groups *is* consciousness? There is also the question of
> "delayed choise"...
> >I distinguish this difference of observations. Thus local systems have
> >different Hilbert spaces as in axiom 1, even when they have common
> >In other words, the local system is the notion that describes the object of
> >observation, that is different from time to time (time is again the time of
> >the observer) and from observer to observer.
> When we say "spacetime" does this not assume, at least, that such is
> what an LS observes of other LSs? I think we agree that there is more
> than one spacetime since each LS's observations make up such. But if the
> subject-object relation is symmetric,
Subject-object relation is not symmetric, because the outside of an LS
consists of an infinite number of particles that cannot be reduced to an LS
which has a finite number of particles, while inside an LS there are only a
finite number of particles.
there is more to this that we have
> covered so far. Remember that length is not an absolute invariant!
> I would like to discuss how the equivalence principle is modeled in LS
> theory. By the way, Prugovecki talks about rigged Hilbert spaces on page
> 446. ("Gel'fand space"!).
What he writes around page 446 are quite elementary things well-known to
mathematicians. How do you intend to utilize those?
He makes a point that I believe is very
> important there. I will comment on it shortly.
> Onward to the Unknown,
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