**Hitoshi Kitada** (*hitoshi@kitada.com*)

*Wed, 7 Apr 1999 01:28:53 +0900*

**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]**Next message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 193] Re: [time 192] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Previous message:**Peter Wegner: "[time 191] Re: [time 190] Re: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Maybe in reply to:**Ben Goertzel: "[time 190] Re: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Next in thread:**Stephen P. King: "[time 193] Re: [time 192] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"

Dear Stephen,

----- Original Message -----

From: Stephen P. King <stephenk1@home.com>

To: Time List <time@kitada.com>

Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 1999 11:58 PM

Subject: [time 189] Re: [time 188] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time

*> Dear Hitoshi,
*

*>
*

*> Perhaps we are both tired. :) I will wait to go over my ideas of QM
*

*> gravity when we both have Eddington's paper on Weyl in hand. I again
*

*> agree with what you are saying below. We are not converging here, it is
*

*> obvious that I am just making noise.
*

*>
*

*> Hitoshi Kitada wrote:
*

*> >
*

*> > Dear Stephen,
*

*> >
*

*> > I try to clarify my position.
*

*> >
*

*> > >From the conlusion, I agree that gravitaion will be given a QM formalism,
*

but

*> > it will be at the last step of my approach.
*

*> >
*

*> > What I am trying to understand is the machinery or structure of our
*

*> > recognition with the expectation that it will clarify physical aspect of
*

*> > gravity. In this point, I think your approach has the same goal, or you
*

will

*> > get to it at least as some byproducts. However, I think it necessary to
*

*> > understand the fundamental structure of observation first.
*

*>
*

*> I am known to be impatient... :)
*

*>
*

*> > I feel you seem to try to get at once the QM theory of gravity, seeing
*

that

*> > you are interested in Weyl's approach. On the other hand, seeing that you
*

seem

*> > to think that interactions as communications are important, Weyl's
*

approach

*> > looks to me slightly different from what you want to understand in terms
*

of

*> > information theoretic approach. I do not see what approach you try to take
*

*> > toward QG.
*

*>
*

*> It is the same as your in the sense of equivalence. Note that how we
*

*> think of a theory is also subject to the axioms of LS theory, and our
*

*> minds are independent LSs. :)
*

Is your intention to explain everything? If so, I have to say "I think it is

impossible."

*>
*

*> > Best wishes,
*

*> > Hitoshi
*

*>
*

*> Can we look at what I wrote more carefully? How does one think of the
*

*> observations occuring between subLSs when one is only observing the
*

*> outside of that LS. Perhaps I am asking a question similar to Ben's:
*

*>
*

*> [BG]
*

*> > Doesn't it violate common sense in some way -- i.e. if particles in
*

distant

*> > locations have interacted before, they may be correlated in their patterns
*

of

*> > movement even when you subtract off the center of mass.
*

*> [HK]
*

*> >You are right:
*

*>
*

*> >The particles are correlated in their patterns of "movement." But it is so,
*

*> >_as far as_ they are considered to "move" according to the "time" of the
*

*> >system to which the particles belong. In other words, the reference frame
*

of

*> >the "movement" is the space-time of the system. The "before" in the above
*

*> >quotation of your opinion should thus be understood the "before" measured
*

in

*> >the frame of this "time" of the system. Namely space-time is proper to each
*

*> >local system. This is the first point.
*

*>
*

*> Do we say that there is a spacetime proper to *each* LS and,
*

*> symmetrically, an LS proper to each spacetime?
*

There is no symmetry between LS and space-time at least in LS theory. LS

theory assumes the existence of space-time for each LS. Probably, the problem

you raise here is that we have a common space-time. My point in LS theory is

that that is only an assumption that cannot be verified, and that it is a

thing that we assume. This is the reason why I impose axioms 4 and 5. This

assumption remedies people from their "common" universe being chaos. But note

that, at the deepest level, there is no assurance that we can have a "common"

universe.

This is another way of

*> saying that for every "subject" there is an "object" and for every
*

*> "object" there is a "subject".
*

There are many objects for every LS.

*>
*

*> >Second, here is another implicit assumption. The particles' "correlation"
*

*> >cannot be known unless the correlation is observed or measured. If no one
*

*> >observes the system, the correlation cannot be known, or is forgotten. The
*

*> >forgotten correlation cannot be traced further. One needs to start to
*

measure

*> >other systems similar to that one, in order to reproduce the observation.
*

In this

*> >sense, the word "observation" has an implicit assumption behind it that the
*

*> >_different_ observations could be identified if one's memory tells one that
*

*> >the situation looks the same as before ("before" in the time coordinate of
*

the

*> >one's, and "one" can be a set of observers, e.g., a set of modern
*

physicists,

*> >that has a time coordinate which might have begun in the 16th century or so
*

*> >(with Galileo Galilei and/or others?)).
*

*>
*

*> Could it be that the act of measurement/observation *is* a mapping of
*

*> correlations,
*

Mapping from where to where? Namely what are the domain and range of your

mapping?

like Edelman's idea that re-entrant mappings between

*> neuronal groups *is* consciousness? There is also the question of
*

*> "delayed choise"...
*

*>
*

*> >I distinguish this difference of observations. Thus local systems have
*

*> >different Hilbert spaces as in axiom 1, even when they have common
*

particles.

*>
*

*> >In other words, the local system is the notion that describes the object of
*

*> >observation, that is different from time to time (time is again the time of
*

*> >the observer) and from observer to observer.
*

*>
*

*> When we say "spacetime" does this not assume, at least, that such is
*

*> what an LS observes of other LSs? I think we agree that there is more
*

*> than one spacetime since each LS's observations make up such. But if the
*

*> subject-object relation is symmetric,
*

Subject-object relation is not symmetric, because the outside of an LS

consists of an infinite number of particles that cannot be reduced to an LS

which has a finite number of particles, while inside an LS there are only a

finite number of particles.

there is more to this that we have

*> covered so far. Remember that length is not an absolute invariant!
*

*> I would like to discuss how the equivalence principle is modeled in LS
*

*> theory. By the way, Prugovecki talks about rigged Hilbert spaces on page
*

*> 446. ("Gel'fand space"!).
*

What he writes around page 446 are quite elementary things well-known to

mathematicians. How do you intend to utilize those?

He makes a point that I believe is very

*> important there. I will comment on it shortly.
*

*>
*

*> Onward to the Unknown,
*

*>
*

*> Stephen
*

*>
*

Best,

Hitoshi

**Next message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 193] Re: [time 192] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Previous message:**Peter Wegner: "[time 191] Re: [time 190] Re: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Maybe in reply to:**Ben Goertzel: "[time 190] Re: [time 187] Re: one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"**Next in thread:**Stephen P. King: "[time 193] Re: [time 192] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time"

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