Stephen P. King (stephenk1@home.com)
Tue, 25 May 1999 14:03:02 -0400
Dear Prof. Schneider,
I am a student of philosophy of science and have been investigating the
mind-body problem for quite some time. I find your paper very
interesting.
In your discussion of Everett's MWI you say: "It has no internal
logical contradiction, but it does not explain a piece of empirical
evidence: there is always only one _actual_ observer. There is a
parallelism with time: in physics, there is no privileged instant such
as "now" on the time line, in contradiction with the empirical evidence
of the actual experience of "now"." pg. 6
Have you considered the possibility that "actuality" (as you define
it!) is a mathematically representable relation, much like the "binary
relation" used in conventional math, between a given observer as a
locally convex (abusing the usual meaning) QM system and a finite
equivalence class of observables at any one of it's "moments"? I am
implying that to say that "there is only one _actual_ observer" is
categorically incorrect for there are by necessity an nonenumerable
class of such "_actual_ observers". Each observer, as a QM system, would
have its own unique measure of time (a "local clock") and thus its own
"now" with its accompanying "actuality". See: http://www.kitada.com/ In
this way we solve the QGR problem...
How communication takes place between these "monads" is via
"bisimulation" as explained by Peter Wegner's paper:
http://www.cs.brown.edu/~pw/papers/math1.ps. There is no direct
interaction, only mutual simulations or "residuations"...
Also, your concept of "Semiotic Reduction" reminds me strongly of the
ideas discussed in Vaughan Pratt's
paper:http://boole.stanford.edu/chuguide.html#ratmech. Pratt's line of
thinking is similar to yours but is framed in the language of computer
science.
I must say that to say that your stament: "it is only when a physical
system is described in words that a measurement takes place" is, "`a la
lettre", too strict a definition. There should be a more general way of
expressing this idea that is not so anthropocentric. Could we say, for
example: "it is only when a description of a physical system is
communicable from one observing system to another that a measurement
takes place"?
What opinion do you have of an information/matter duality (as explained
by Pratt in terms of Mind and Body)?
I am involved with an informal collaboration group discussing these
issues in light of the work of Hitoshi Kitada:
http://metasci.kitada.com/cgi-bin/md-sub.cgi
Kindest regards,
Stephen
http://members.home.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
or
https://members.home.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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