**Stephen P. King** (*stephenk1@home.com*)

*Mon, 26 Jul 1999 14:30:43 -0400*

**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]**Next message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 497] [Fwd: Fuzzy projections and cylindrical extensions]"**Previous message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 495] Re: [time 494] Observation models"**In reply to:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 494] [time 487] Re: [time 480] Parallel translation, etc...part VI (!)"**Next in thread:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 501] Re: [time 491]Forms, Entailment structures, intersections, etc."

Dear Matti,

Matti Pitkanen wrote:

snip

[MP]

*> > LOGOS= COSMOS is what I indeed assume.
*

[SPK]

*> Yes, I agree, it is just that I see LOGOS as only asymptotically
*

*> infinite. The phylogenetic hierachy represents the process of the LOGOS.
*

*> Remember LOGOS is an action, "the verb" in greek, literally!
*

MP]

*> I see LOGOS as wisdom existing there, objective realities.
*

*> You mean by LOGOS the cognitive
*

*> process (cascades generating selfs and essentially phenomenon of
*

*> subjective reality).
*

So, do you see the LOGOS as an a priori Platonic FORM? I understand it

as such, but say that, to think of LOGOS as a FORM is to automatically

make it unknowable, e.g. we are framing it as an aspect of the ONE. I am

considering the finite implementation of the LOGOS with in the MANY. The

duality (TWO) of aspects of the MANY are united in the ONE. So we have a

trinity. Umm, I think that category theory has formal ways to thinking

of this situation!

snip

[MP]

*> OK. I define qualities as red, green, etc.., as properties
*

*> of experiences, not properties of the world. You
*

*> obviously see them properties of the world. More generally,
*

*> Hume's law says that values are not in the world
*

*> since one cannot measure values. I agree, values relate to quantum jumps,
*

*> subjective reality not physical realities. What about values
*

*> in your approach?
*

Values are given only within finite contexts. I am thinking as Mach

did. We will discuss this more when we get into the Schommers

material...

snip

[MP]

*> > These isomorphisms between local systems are replaced in my approach
*

*> > by mappings of real geometric structure to their p-adic counterparts:
*

*> > there is ineed 'reality' (realities) and this reality is mapped
*

*> > to p-adicity of particular self. There is no direct mapping
*

*> > between selves.
*

[SPK]

*> YES! This is what Pratt is saying in ratmech.ps! "Bodies can not
*

*> interact directly..."
*

[MP]

*> > You could counterargue that there is no communciation between selves
*

*> > in my approach: communciation is contained in quantum jump:
*

*> > Psi_i--> UPsi_i --Psi_f
*

*> >
*

*> > U is the informational time development giving rise to informational
*

*> > currents modelling the communication. Selves can hence
*

*> > communicate by forming cognitive representations about other
*

*> > selves as subselves. This is only mimicry but it is enough!
*

[SPK]

*> That is all I say that interactions are! You and I are respectively
*

*> "real" to each other only within the "window" of our computer inteface.
*

*> Tis is what Peter's work talks about. Each Observer (LS) can only
*

*> "interact" with others "through" the surface that is modeled as a common
*

*> surface. (Here we think of LSs as being like the insides of bubbles that
*

*> share a surface.)
*

*>
*

[MP] This common surface is the 'real' reality behind p-adic realities

*> in TGD.
*

But, do you insist that this common surface is a priori to the

experience of such. I do not think so as I see that observational

properties are only probabilities prior to actual observation. Thus I

say that the actualization of the local properties of the common

surfaces are given by the end result of the quantum jump, it is not a

"'real' reality" a priori!

SPK]

*> To interact is to mimic each other's internal behaviour. This is what
*

*> is defined as "bisimulation"; your mind, with its actions, simulates the
*

*> actions of my body and my mind, with its actions, simulates the actions
*

*> of your body. If our respective simulations are identical, our knowledge
*

*> of each other is total! We would be one and the same person. The fact
*

*> that our framings of the world differ is an indication of the difference
*

*> that occurs in our bisimulations of each other.
*

*> The beforementioned notion of almost dijointness is relevant here!
*

*>
*

*> [MP] Selves within us provide these simulations. Selves for
*

*> all kinds of objects we perceive either outside or inside our
*

*> body.
*

Yes! :-)

snip

[MP]

*> > Objective existence has nothing to with meaning, would I say.
*

*> > Qualities and meaning are involved with quantum jump between objective
*

*> > existences. Matter does not give meaning: it is change
*

*> > of material configuration which contains the meaning.
*

[SPK]

*> Yes! Information content gives matter meaning, but only in the
*

*> bisimulational sense. Remember how information is defined in terms of
*

*> mutual agreements of associations. Thus if the material symbol "tree"
*

*> implies a green, leafy, fruitbearing, shadow-creating, etc. object for
*

*> you and for me, then we transfer information using such symbols. Howard
*

*> Pattee's papers are an excellent discussion of this notion:
*

*> http://ssie.binghamton.edu/~pattee/
*

[MP]

*> Mutual agreemens of associations would results in my framework
*

*> from the formation of abstractions: self containing unentangled
*

*> subselves experiences what it is to be average subself.
*

*> Quantum statistical determinism implies that these averages
*

*> tend to be more or less same: you 'tree' =about my 'tree'.
*

*>
*

*> Question: who I am? Am I self or abstraction of subselves
*

*> of a larger self? What is Earth: is it really individual
*

*> Earth or abstraction about planets circling some average
*

*> star we call Sun?(;-)
*

Your self (in each moment) are the weighted sum of the subselves that

have entailments greater than or equal to the pinary cut off for that

moment's entailment structure. This is dual to the light-cone structure

that delineates the material causality of that event.

The Earth, and any other object for that matter, follows the same

definition, the key is the dual light-cone\logical entailment structure.

This picture is a bit deceptive since it is a static picture, like the

notion of the instantaneous movement in the calculus. It is really a

process and the static picture is merely a way of thinking of it...

[MP]

*> > And also change of informational configuration: in quantum
*

*> > jumps conscious information gain is the difference
*

*> > between initial and final informations. Selves are eaters
*

*> > of information and U generates it in every quantum jump: we
*

*> > live in an information-prosperous world.
*

[SPK]

*> Yes, the construction of a self dissipates information, in the
*

*> sense that observing a given event or configuration alters it such that
*

*> its information content vanishes. This is the information equivalent to
*

*> the consumption of free energy or the generation of thermodynamic entropy!
*

*> The "U", I see as the construction of a new menu of choices from which
*

*> the observation is made. This united free will with the idea of local
*

*> determinism, e.g. each LS determines its reality, but only to the degree
*

*> that it can predict its behaviour.
*

[MP] You identify nondeterminism and nonpredictability. I regard

*> nondeterminism as real phenonenon having nothing to do with
*

*> predictability. Even very young childs can differentiate between living
*

*> creatures and nonliving objects: they certainly cannot predict the
*

*> behaviour of nonliving objects. This supports
*

*> that nonpredictability not= nondeterminism.
*

This deserves a separate discussion! My thinking is that determinism

(causality) follows Peter's use of hypersets and not the usual classical

notion!

[SPK]

*> If the LS has infinite predictive
*

*> power, we get the absolute determinism of Newton and Laplace, if the LS
*

*> has zero predictive power, we get the complete randomness of
*

*> conventional QM. By allowing the computational (e.g. predictive) power
*

*> of an LS to range from 0 to 1 by "fuzzifying" the notion of a
*

*> topological neighborhood of a point, we can think of an LS as having a
*

*> real valued \epsilon of "self-determination". [WOW, I have not been
*

*> able to say this idea so well before! It has been a picture in my mind
*

*> for a very long time.]
*

*> Anyway, when we apply the pinary mapping formalism that you are
*

*> expert at, we get a model with a hierarchy of ever more "expressive"
*

*> [Peter's word] LSs. :-)
*

[MP]

*> Objection! QM is NOT completely nondeterministic! Far from that.
*

*> It would be easy to model QM mechanically if this were the case.
*

*> Only discrete subset of the states is possible outcome in quantum jump:
*

*> this is what I think makes hopeless the simulation of QM
*

*> probabilistically.
*

I was talking about how it is assumed that the quantum jumps are purely

random. I do not think so! I think Peter's conjecture about the role of

"Secondary Observers" is valid! I disagree with Einstein in the idea of

local determinism, the quantum jump is "aimed" by non-local interactions

(the minimization computation). It is easy to forget that there it is

impossible to isolate any thing! We need to discuss this notion!

snip

MP]

*> > I state this somewhat inprecisely. I should have said that
*

*> > only some components of curvature tensor commute.
*

*> > This relates to the canonical quantization of metric as quantum field.
*

*> >
*

*> > a) The components of 3-metric are commuting physical
*

*> > quantities. g_ij: 6 alltogether. The remaining
*

*> > components of metric are nondynamical since general coordinate
*

*> > invariance (4 coordinates) implies that 4 components of metric
*

*> > are nondynamical and can be fixed: this gauge condition
*

*> > fixes the coordinates used. g_00 and g_0i are indeed
*

*> > good candidates for components of metric tensor fixed by some
*

*> > coordinate conditions. For instance g_0i could vanish.
*

*> >
*

*> > b) In quantization one constructs Hamiltonian formalism and
*

*> > identifies the canonical momentum densities as
*

*> > partial derivatives of Lagrangian density (curvature scalar
*

*> > times sqrt(g) with respect to time derivatives of metric
*

*> > components g_ij. Canonical momentum densities and g_ij commute
*

*> > to delta function as operators: this is microlocal causality
*

*> > stating that gravitons are point like particles.
*

*> >
*

*> > This is how it should roughly work. Unfortunately it does not.
*

*>
*

*> Yes! I think that the main problem is that "point-like particles"
*

*> can not encode curvature, it is a non-local notion. Penrose talkes about
*

*> this in his work on 'twistors" space-time has no curvature, in his
*

*> model, until an infinite number of "gravitons" are introduced in it! I
*

*> believe that Frieden's method of constructing Lagrangians from the
*

*> Fisher information is a strong clue for us, since the information
*

*> involved in the bisimulation idea is exactly what Fisher information is
*

*> about! We, hopefully, will get into this in detail soon. I wish Frieden
*

*> would join our group!
*

*>
*

*> [MP] I think that the basic problem is the concept of point like
*

*> particle: particles are not pointlike: they are small 3-surfaces, would
*

*> I say. When particle becomes very large it becomes the space in which
*

*> smaller particles reside (topological sum). This is really
*

*> big idea: particle and space containing it are only instances
*

*> of one and the same thing! Getting rid of a concept is always
*

*> a victory!
*

Yes, but is it possible that we need to wean ourselves away from the

use of the assumption that every observer's world is one and the same.

All that is really required is an understanding of how observers (LSs)

communicate (and thus interact) with each other!

*> I am not too enthusiastic about Fisher information, too specific.
*

*> This I-J decomposition also leads to nonsensical consequences in TGD
*

*> framework. Signs do not come correctly.
*

I think it would help if we discussed this in detail step by step. It

would be a terrible thing if we ignore it just because we can't easily

fit it into our pet models!

*> I interpret Kahler action as a measure for the cognitive
*

*> degeneracy of spacetime surface. This interpretation involves
*

*> a hypothesis about what this degeneracy is: it is motivated
*

*> by thermodynamical analogy but I cannot prove this hypothesis.
*

Let us discuss this! Tell me the details. :-)

snip

[MP]

*> > Some people are promiting the idea that realities are intersections
*

*> > of higher-dimensional realities. Interesting idea but I do not know how
*

*> > to realize it.
*

*>
*

*> We are discussing it right here and now! LSs are
*

*> "higher-dimensional realities", their interactions are "intersections"! We
*

*> just need to genetralize our language to n-dimensions! People are trapped
*

*> by their ignorance in 2-dimensions. Ever read the work of P. D. Ouspensky?
*

*> http://www.fourthway.org/
*

*>
*

*> [MP] I have not. LS could be also 4-dimensional realities: their
*

*> intersections would correspond to the elementary particle horizons
*

*> at which spacetime metric is degenerate: much like
*

*> blackhole horizons. Always in pairs.
*

Could you elaborate on this last point?

Onward!

Stephen

**Next message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 497] [Fwd: Fuzzy projections and cylindrical extensions]"**Previous message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 495] Re: [time 494] Observation models"**In reply to:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 494] [time 487] Re: [time 480] Parallel translation, etc...part VI (!)"**Next in thread:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 501] Re: [time 491]Forms, Entailment structures, intersections, etc."

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