[time 511] Re: [time 510] Re: [time 509] Observation models

Matti Pitkanen (matpitka@pcu.helsinki.fi)
Mon, 2 Aug 1999 07:57:24 +0300 (EET DST)

On Sun, 1 Aug 1999, Stephen P. King wrote:

> Dear Matti,
> I am working on a big post on Pratt's work. I'll shorten this one a
> lot....

OK. I have been also working intensively: writing chapter about
self: I will tell about new ideas later. Just one especially interesting
idea now. I remember that you talked about sequences of observations
in earlier discussions. In the original 'cs is nothing but quantum jumps'
dogma, it assumed there is not subjective memory, genuine memory about
earlier quantum jumps.
Only yesterday I realized, that the introduction of self
as subsystem able to remain p-adically unentangled changes the situation.
A very attractive hypothesis for how subjective memory is realized,
emerges. I glue a short piece of text and after that a couple of comments.


 The contents of consciousness are determined totally by the initial and
final states of the quantum jump. This has been the basic assumption of
TGD inspired theory of consciousness hitherto.
A heavy objection against this assumption
 is that, since contents of consciousness are determined
by the initial and final state of the quantum jump, it is not possible
to have any memories about previous quantum jumps. One
could even argue that in this kind of universe it is not possible
to discover that there is series of quantum jumps.
There is a possible way out of this problem.
 The ensemble of cognitive spacetime sheets performing quantum jumps
with time dependent average outcome makes in principle
possible to have memories about
earlier experiences by re-experiencing the thoughts generated
by them. Of course, only simulations are in question
and one could argue that this is not enough.

The proposed identification of self however forces
to reconsider this assumption.
Nothing precludes the possibility that a connected
series of subsequent quantum jumps performed by self
integrates to single conscious experience. This
hypothesis would provide
strong realization for the idea about continuous
streams of consciousness and realize self as an extended
object in subjective time.

 The option would realize genuine memory with respect to
subjective time and make possible to remember something about
previous quantum jumps. The temporal integration
of the conscious experiences to single experience would
conform with the 'ontogeny repeats phylogeny' principle
in the sense that the integration would correspond to the
necessary generalization of 3-surface to association sequence consisting
of minimal number of spacelike 3-surfaces with timelike mutual
separations. Neurophysiological time quantum seems to be some fraction
of second and this would suggest that the duration of self
is typically of the same order and corresponds to short term
memory, or actually a hierarchy of short term memories.
Of course, the entanglement with larger selves with longer
duration with respect to subjective time would make
it possible to genuinely remember what happened in
quantum jumps, which really occurred, say in (subjective)

Subjective memory would also make possible to understand
how concepts involving intentionality
could be realized in quantum framework (plans, desires,

Some comments below on your questions.

> Matti Pitkanen wrote:
> snip
> [SPK]
> > > But is it not true that symbols are information when we think of them
> > > as having a "meaning" but are material configurations when we think of
> > > quantities such as charge, mass, spin, etc. ? A robot has all of its
> > > behavior predetermined, it has not free-will!
> [MP]
> > I would say that symbols are more: they are conscious subselves
> > representing someting (in external world). Selves as robots
> > is of course the great failure of AI. The capture of basic
> > hierarchical structures of cognitive processing and mechnization
> > of logical thinking is its victory and also quantum theories
> > of cs must be able to reproduce this part of computationalism
> > (neuroscience and cognitive psychology rely strongly on computational
> > approach).
> Have you read Howard Pattee's papers?
> http://ssie.binghamton.edu/~pattee/ I think that you would find them
> interesting! :-)
I am not sure. I will look.

> > The key question is: is classical theory only approximation
> > of quantum theory or essential part of it. In standard physics
> > answer is 'only approximation', in TGD the answer is 'essential
> > part of it'. That TGD answer is possible relates directly to
> > the hypothesis that spacetimes are 4-surfaces. This
> > hypothesis also solves the energy problem of GRT.
> Why can't we just think of classical theory as a useful model for
> dealing with situations where velocities and energies are low? It is
> just a way of thinking about the world, it is not "the world"!

One must be careful with what one means by classical theory: I mean
the concept of spacetime. What I mean that classical theory assigns to
3-surface unique 4-surface and that Dirac equation for
the induced spinors is satisfied. I do not mean
Newtonian mechanics for electron nor neglect of quantum effects.

I believe that spacetime, or more precisely quantum
state as superposition of
macroscopically equivalent spacetimes is necessary concept.
We formulate every physical experiment using this concept
and our everyday thinking relies on it.

And then purely mathematical reason for classicality: in quantum TGD mere
General Coordinate Invariance forces the concept of classical spacetime:
Diff^4 must have spacetime surface to act on.

It is very difficult to understand
why stationary phase approximation of GRT could explain
the emergene of classcal spacetime at the level of cs experience.
World would be only effectively classical in the sense that
the transition amplitudes would be expressed as perturbation
theory around classical spacetime.
Secondly, stationary phase approximation
of GRT does not even work: one must Euclidize in attempt of trying to get
some sense to the formulas and the connection with the world
of obsevations is totally lost.

> [MP]
> > > > Yes. Let me see this from my viewpoint. I have definition of self as
> > > > quantum subsystem: the geometric definition
> > > > underlies it. The event horizons associated with wormholes (metric
> > > > determinant vanishes since metric changes from 1-1-1-1 to -1-1-1-1
> > > > signature are natural boundaries of selves.
> [SPK]
> > > I do not understand your thinking here. How do you know that it is a
> > > metric chance involved in the boundary of a self?
> [MP]
> > The surface at which signature changes is natural candidate
> > for a boundary of self. All what remains inside boundary forms kind of
> > causal closure *classically*: geodesics do not lead out.
> Like an event horizon of a black-hole?
Much like this.


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