Matti Pitkanen (matpitka@pcu.helsinki.fi)
Sat, 7 Aug 1999 08:40:52 +0300 (EET DST)
On Sat, 7 Aug 1999, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Dear Matti,
>
> It appears that I am unable to argue Pratt's case adequately. So, I
> will try another tack. I have re-read Time V
> (http://www.kitada.com/time_V.html), and think that it offers a simple
> concept that I may be able to discuss better. I will reply to [time 516]
> as soon as possible.
OK. I hope my rhetorics was not too provocative. It was just rhetorics
in order to clarify what we were talking about(;-)!
What interests me would be opinions about what are the fundamental
operations performed by conscious computational mind, operations which
do not reduce to anything simpler. I have been able to identify too such
operations in TGD framework.
Comparison of prediction for geometric time development and
memory about subjective time development
would be one basic operation. Most emotions would reflect the result of
comparison of this kind (frustration, happiness,..)
[Geometric 'memory' is essentially simulation for what
will happen and happened assuming that no quantum jumps would occur (world
would be classical) and gives rise to intentionality: plans, desires,
expectations, guesses what events led to particular situation,
classical physics,.... Subjective time development corresponds
to quantum jumps and subjective me memory is about quantum jumps occurred
after the wake-up of self].
Self could perhaps also compare its subselves representing symbols in
accuracy given by pinary cutoff and say whether they are identical or not
in some respects. This aspect might be important for computationalism.
Communication by copying or reproducing selves or programs identified as
self cascades could be also basic operation.
But what other fundamental operations not reducible to anything simpler
one could imagine? Help of a computationalist would be needed!(:-)
Best,
MP
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