Hitoshi Kitada (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Fri, 13 Aug 1999 18:32:43 +0900
----- Original Message -----
From: Stephen P. King <email@example.com>
To: Matti Pitkanen <firstname.lastname@example.org>; <email@example.com>
Sent: Friday, August 13, 1999 4:23 PM
Subject: [time 533] Re: [time 530] Surreal numbers
> Surreals are a very new idea. There is an article about them in a
> science magazine, I think Discover, that explains them. I will try
> find a reference for it. I remember it as being very informative!
> found it: Discover Magazine. Shulman, Polly; 12-01-1995 "Infinity
> one and other surreal numbers". Also:
> http://www.maa.org/mathland/mathland_3_18.html and
> You make a very good point here, but I believe that Dennett is
> in thinking that the difference between, say "files of numbers"
> "mechanism of the reading head" are only differences in *degree*
> that this is all there is to be said of the situation. If we are
> strictly talking about the information content of the physical
> embodiments of these informational structures, we can see that the
> difference in only in degree, but Dennett's material monism blinds
> to the categorical difference in *kind* that exists between the
> object" (information about) A* and the physical object A.
> > Isn't the situation same in physics? To take example relating to
> > discussions. Could it be that spacetime geometry is tacit
> > The dynamics of spacetime surface defined Kahler action as
> > principle is tacit information not allowing representation in
> > of LS interactions: simply because it defines these
> > Same would apply to unitary time evolution U: it would also
> > 'raw physics'. Explicit (DNA, short term memory?) and
> > explicit (motor program in my brain realized as cascades of
> > term memory realized in terms of self hierachy and communication
> > levels of hierarchy?) information would emerge only at the
> > selves emerge.
> Given my comment above, I agree with you here! :-) (Does Dennett
> for "implicit" as the complement of "explicit"? I have read his
> but I can't remember...)
> In Hitoshi's LS theory, the "outsides" of LS are "physical" and
> "insides" are "mental", I think!? We could categorize the
> involved in the external behavior of LS in the way you describe
It is human's convenience to distinguish the outside and inside.
Under this convenient method, the world (or the outside) might
_look_ as following, e.g. pinary physics, even if it would decribe
well the nature. But this is just a look! The primes are a notion
very humanistic. How can one see the nature? Or How can one believe
what he sees is what others see?
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