[time 536] Re: [time 533] Re: [time 530] Surreal numbers

Hitoshi Kitada (hitoshi@kitada.com)
Fri, 13 Aug 1999 18:32:43 +0900

Dear Stephen,

----- Original Message -----
From: Stephen P. King <stephenk1@home.com>
To: Matti Pitkanen <matpitka@pcu.helsinki.fi>; <time@kitada.com>
Sent: Friday, August 13, 1999 4:23 PM
Subject: [time 533] Re: [time 530] Surreal numbers


> Surreals are a very new idea. There is an article about them in a
> science magazine, I think Discover, that explains them. I will try
> find a reference for it. I remember it as being very informative!
:-) (I
> found it: Discover Magazine. Shulman, Polly; 12-01-1995 "Infinity
> one and other surreal numbers". Also:
> http://www.maa.org/mathland/mathland_3_18.html and
> http://www.askdrmath.com/problems/robert.7.15.96.html)
> You make a very good point here, but I believe that Dennett is
> in thinking that the difference between, say "files of numbers"
and the
> "mechanism of the reading head" are only differences in *degree*
> that this is all there is to be said of the situation. If we are
> strictly talking about the information content of the physical
> embodiments of these informational structures, we can see that the
> difference in only in degree, but Dennett's material monism blinds
> to the categorical difference in *kind* that exists between the
> object" (information about) A* and the physical object A.
> > Isn't the situation same in physics? To take example relating to
> > discussions. Could it be that spacetime geometry is tacit
> > The dynamics of spacetime surface defined Kahler action as
> > principle is tacit information not allowing representation in
> > of LS interactions: simply because it defines these
> > Same would apply to unitary time evolution U: it would also
> > 'raw physics'. Explicit (DNA, short term memory?) and
> > explicit (motor program in my brain realized as cascades of
selves, long
> > term memory realized in terms of self hierachy and communication
> > levels of hierarchy?) information would emerge only at the
level when
> > selves emerge.
> Given my comment above, I agree with you here! :-) (Does Dennett
> for "implicit" as the complement of "explicit"? I have read his
> but I can't remember...)
> In Hitoshi's LS theory, the "outsides" of LS are "physical" and
> "insides" are "mental", I think!? We could categorize the
> involved in the external behavior of LS in the way you describe
> :-)

It is human's convenience to distinguish the outside and inside.
Under this convenient method, the world (or the outside) might
_look_ as following, e.g. pinary physics, even if it would decribe
well the nature. But this is just a look! The primes are a notion
very humanistic. How can one see the nature? Or How can one believe
what he sees is what others see?

> Onward!
> Stephen

Best wishes,

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.0b3 on Sat Oct 16 1999 - 00:36:29 JST