**Stephen P. King** (*stephenk1@home.com*)

*Wed, 25 Aug 1999 20:03:59 -0400*

**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]**Next message:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 618] Re: [time 616] Re: [time 611] Re: [time 610] Fwd Marmet's reply #2 again"**Previous message:**Stephen P. King: "[time 616] Re: [time 611] Re: [time 610] Fwd Marmet's reply #2 again"**In reply to:**Matti Pitkanen: "[time 611] Re: [time 610] Fwd Marmet's reply #2 again"

Dear Bill,

I really appreciate these questions! I must admit that my answers are

only tentative as I am do fully cognizant of your meanings... :-)

WDEshleman@aol.com wrote:

*>
*

*> Stephen
*

*>
*

*> Here are some concerns I have:
*

*>
*

*> 1) Do a majority of other worlds differ only by tiny amounts
*

*> from our world...or are close copies in the minority? That is,
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*> do the majority of other worlds contain close copies of our
*

*> brains, bodies, etc...or do the majority of other worlds contain
*

*> copies of our fermions spread out over solar systems and
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*> galaxies?
*

Well, I am not sure but if we consider that the Universe, as the

totality of existence, "contains" all possible finite and infinite

"versions" of itself; all that could be experienced and thus all that

must exist so that we can have some way to get logical consistent

chaining of observations, which is what define as our subjective

histories, there would have to be an innumerable number of different

worlds.

When we say "other worlds" it is assumed that we are referring to

worlds different from the "one" we think that we are experiencing. What

is the range of the possible differences, well, if we assume an infinite

Universe from which to construct experienced worlds as I do, then there

would be at least an infinite number of worlds that differed in at least

one aspect. We can discover differences when we map the objects in those

worlds to the numbers.

We could use the class (or set?) of the Integers as the "smallest"

infinity we have available. (We could restrict our selves to finite

numbers, but it is easy to see that this is automatically incomplete.)

Ok, let us label each world with an integer and let us assume that these

worlds can be decomposed and composed into "parts", say fermions,

bosons, brains, bodies, etc. Planck's constant aside, it is obvious that

any world can be composed from an infinite number of "parts" of other

worlds and this results, via Cantor's diagonalization into a proof that

there exist at least an uncountable (with integers) infinity of worlds.

Now, let us look for simplicity at worlds that differ just in terms of

their photons (and there there are inherent problems in figuring out

exactly how we can distinguish photons from different worlds, unless we

allow for a Weyl geometry with its real valued variation of gauge...).

Ok, the frequency of the electromagnetic wave can vary by infinitesimal

amounts, can it not? If so then the worlds that have infinitesimally

different EMF variations are separate. We could also consider

infinitesimal variations of the constants!

Are "close copies" a minority or majority? Well, there measure

theoretic properties of real valued labeled worlds is "measure one", in

other words it is certain that if we picked a pair of worlds out of an

urn that they would look almost alike! The article by F.W. Meyerstein

(http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS//researchreports/089walter.pdf) is

a good discussion of this!

*> 2) Are the copies of our fermions, fermions or bosons and
*

*> does this make a difference?
*

Well, this goes back to the difficulty that I see in figuring out how

to tell particles apart... Umm, according to QM, we can not make copies

of particles!

http://www.uibk.ac.at/c/c7/c704/qo/photon/_teleport/tpidea.html,

http://www.aip.org/physnews/preview/1997/qinfo/text.htm#4

Exactly what do we mean by this question? Umm, I am having trouble with

this one! :-(

*> 3) Can observers ever get anything but a subjective view
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*> of things? That is, will we never have the ability to
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*> objectively distinguish a 3-D "entangled" universe from a
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*> MW multiverse?
*

I can't image how it will ever be possible to "get anything but a

subjective view of things" that is a "meaningful and communicable

experience". But, my imagination is finite and thus not an completely

trustworthy authority! :-) As I see it, the necessary requirements for a

truly "objective" view of the Universe are something we already have!

White noise is a good example of what is it like to experience the

"in-itself". It is all possibilities simultaneously and without bias.

The MW multiverse is exactly that by definition.

*> 4) Are "splits" and "jumps" subjective and the same...or
*

*> are one or both objective properties?
*

Umm, I think that the terms "slits" and "jumps" are complementary way

of explaining the same thing. If we assume the Schroedinger wave of a

particular unique world and measurements "cause" it to bifurcate, we use

the word split. If we consider that there is no bifurcation but instead

a global change in the space-time geometry and topology (subject to

restraints of course) then we say "jump". It is just a matter of

perspective. As to their being subjective or objective, well, since only

those "in" those worlds would experience the worlds and as they would be

"carried" along in the bifurcation or jump they would not be able to

directly perceive it. It is only in inferring from

communications/interactions between the worlds that any approximation to

"objectivity" can be obtained.

*> 5) Would the interference connections with other worlds
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*> from observers in our world be identical...or would there more
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*> logically be a hierarchy of connections? Like the 2^LEVEL
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*> hierarchy I have suggested.
*

Umm, I am not sure. I lean toward the idea that there are a hierarchy

of connections as this is how I think of properties (!), but it appears

that both you and Matti are correct. I see "connections" as n-ary

relations. The 2^LEVEL hierarchy gives subsethood properties that in

turn give us the ability to have overlappings (and underlappings) in our

subjective observations and thus gives us an approximation to

"objectivity". Matti's p-adic hierarchy is different, it looks at the

connections in terms of phylogeny. The former appear to be related to

complexity of types and the latter to organization of types of

relations.

Could you elaborate some more about your thinking of 2^LEVEL hierarchy?

Onward!

Stephen

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