Koichiro Matsuno (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Mon, 13 Dec 1999 15:29:22 +0900
Dear Hitoshi and All,
At 2:09 on 13 Dec 1999, Hitoshi Kitada <email@example.com> wrote:
>>Any agency appeared in a completed monologue must necessarily maintains
>>the pre-established harmony with the Universe of the monologic discourse,
>>otherwise the integrity of the monologue would be ruined. The monologic
>>author can remain anonymous there. Leibniz on Monadology and Kant on the
>>Transcendental Ego living with space and time as a singular universal seem
>>to be a good company in seeing a consistent Universe as following the
>>similar nominalist tradition. In contrast, any agency appearing in an
>>on-going dialogue comes to live with lively exchanges and will survive if
>>does it well. As far as the harmony already established in the empirical
>>domain is concerned, Leibniz' Monadology would be too much.
>In what points is Leibniz' Monadoloy, restricted to the empirical domain,
>much?" I.e. what are the extra assumptions or arguments in Leibniz'
>restricted to the empirical domain, and if any why are they so? Another
>is how "the harmony" is "already established in the empirical domain?"
Consider, for instance, Euclidean geometry as the prototype of all
possible Universes of consistent monologic discourse. A point and a line in
the geometry are taken to be monads each of which represents the same
Euclidean Universe from a different point of view. These monads are
immaterial and thus cannot act. They assume perception, but not
apperception. Apparent interaction between the monads in the form of various
theorems is explained in terms of the principle of preestablished harmony.
The consistent discourse is guaranteed upon the two principles on
noncontradiction (the truth of reason) and on sufficient reason (the truth
of fact). However, Monadology lacks the law of causality except for
appealing to the divine intellect. At this point, the issue of
incompleteness may arise in the sense that consistency alone cannot be good
enough for completeness. Some people may feel dissatisfied with the
Euclidean consistent Universe and come up with another alternative. This
dissatisfaction has occurred historically in the empirical domain. My point
is that the implicit causation underlying Monadology is not justified
empirically. If it is forcibly applied, the resulting monadology would
mislead our empirical reality.
In almost the similar vein, the harmony already established in the
empirical domain can be linguistically addressed in the present perfect
tense, though it has to be admitted to be a linguistic artifact at best.
>> If we take the
>> atom to mean Dalton's (empirical) rather than Democritus' (nominal),
>> Leibnizian monads may also require its update though the post-established
>> harmony would remain intact.
>What kind of update do you think may be required and why is it necessary?
The principle of causation can be internalized. Once the committed
consistency turns out to be incomplete, the reverberation would come to
influence what have been taken to be the so-called monads. Each monad would
come to perceive a different Universe from a different point of view, with
the consequence of destroying the preestablished harmony. Perception of
incompleteness proceeding in the empirical domain causes an action, which
certainly does not assume the divine intellect. The present perfect tense
is a linguistic means to see how well the perception-action cycle has
survived so far.
>from where did you introduce the "post-established harmony?"
Again, this is due to the linguistic artifact such that we cannot get rid
of the present perfect tense.
>Is it your
>additional axiom to Leibniz' or do you work in a framework different from
>Leibniz'? I.e. I do not see in which context you are arguing, and if I
>that you are arguing in the empirical domain, I did not see the logic which
>you to "the post-established harmony" and your conclusion: "Leibnizian
>may also require its update."
In short, perception of incompleteness by whatever monads may cause
ceaseless reverberations in Leibnizian monadologies. This fate may be
inevitable even in any consistent monologic discourse. Once it is recognized
that any philosophical or metaphysical discourses have been subject to
severe criticisms by the thinkers in the later generation, the
perception-action cycle will be seen inevitable in the empirical domain.
Leibniz didn't bother himself with this nasty problem. The notion of
completeness is quite strange. It can be smuggled in and even occupy the
empirical domain. I might be off the point a bit.
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