Hitoshi Kitada (email@example.com)
Mon, 6 Dec 1999 18:59:49 +0900
Dear Koichiro and all,
Koichiro Matsuno <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
Subject: [time 1091] Re: [time 1089] Re: [time 1086] intensities
> > So, I believe that we need a logical formalism that gives us a way of
> >relating these two perspectives! What if, in some way, they were
> >complements of each other? On one hand, we have a Universe forever at
> >equilibrium with any proper subset of itself and thus having as subsets
> >Minkowskian hypersurfaces that are in constant uniform motion with
> >respect to each other. On another hand, we have a multitude of finite
> >framings, that somehow, when we allow for comparison between them, are
> >not in uniform motion with each other!
> >Then the question becomes: What is the mechanism of this act of
> >comparison, using the term mechanism loosely?
> It must be an ontological issue. Comparison requires an epistemology, but
> making commitments, if failed, must pay the price by itself. Of course, I do
> know the standard practice of empirical sciences tries hard to avoid making
> such commitments as much as possible.
This avoidance seems to me to be "intentional." Being empirical to nature
may not be possible or may be just a pretension because we always have
a set of assumptions to nature when we observe her. You wrote in [time 1086]:
> Aristotle must have definitely thought of the souvenir shop when he
> emphasized final causation, but I am not sure whether he would have also
> thought of the approaching danger of collisions. It is extremely difficult
> to represent the approaching danger properly. In fact, the Galilean-
> Newtonian scheme was brave enough to dismiss such thins smacking of final
> causes altogether from the very start.
The difficulty of "representing the approaching danger, etc." might have made
the empirical sciences to take the easier bypass to "dismiss such thins smacking
of final causes altogether from the very start."
> At issue is how to appreciate the
> difference between the present progressive and the present perfect tense.
> In other words, it must be an imperative to note that the present perfect
> tense is a linguistic artifact in the legitimate sense of the word. This
> may become clearer if we consider the contrast between "is walking" and
> "have walked so far". A similar line of argument may apply to "clocking".
> Ameliorating the linguistic artifact necessarily resting upon the present
> perfect (e.g., as in the difference, if any, between "have walked" and "
> have walked so far") must be the prime mover of clocking. It may be
> intentional, but not in the transcendental sense of Husserl.
So you think "clocking" is a consequence of linguistic artifact to have a better
or more beautiful expression of things? I may agree in the point that clocking
is no more than an artifact created for humans' convenience. Anthropic principle
may be nothing but a tautology in this context that sciences of humans are made
by humans for humans themselves.
Could you explain "the transcendental sense of Husserl" in relation with your
statement "It may be intentional, but not in the transcendental sense of
Husserl." I could not catch exact meaning here.
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