[time 1093] Re: [time 1092] Re: [time 1091] Re: [time 1089] Re: [time 1086] intensities

Koichiro Matsuno (kmatsuno@vos.nagaokaut.ac.jp)
Tue, 7 Dec 1999 12:47:14 +0900

Dear Hitoshi an All:

   On 6 Dec 1999, Hitoshi Kitada <hitoshi@kitada.com> wrote:

>So you think "clocking" is a consequence of linguistic artifact to
>have a better or more beautiful expression of things?

   Rather, I should say that "clocking" must be the best of all the
artifacts that must be inevitable anyhow so long as we admit ourselves to be
the speaking animals. It can bridge the chasm between the present perfect
and the present progressive.

>Could you explain "the transcendental sense of Husserl" in
>relation with your statement "It [clocking] may be intentional,
>but not in the transcendental sense of Husserl." I could not
>exact meaning here.

   Consider, for instance, the statement "The gazelle makes a quick turn in
order to escape from the hunting panther." The phenomenologist including
Husserl would say that the gazelle is intentional in the sense that the turn
it makes is not a consequence of deductive inference on the part of the
gazelle. It could make other turn. That is the noninference criterion of
intentionality. Also, the gazelle has to do such skillful turns frequently
in order to survive for some time. That is the coherence criterion of
intentionality. The hallmark of Husserlian Phenomenology is that both the
noninference and the coherence criterion are non-empirical. These two
criteria are transcendental. It is the phenomenologist, instead of the
gazelle, who is responsible for making such transcendental statements. This
aspect of assuming the transcendental attitude is what most empirical
scientists do not like to accept.

   In contrast, if one distinguishes between "is making a quick turn" and
"has made a quick turn", the noninference criterion of intentionality which
the phenomenologist perceives will be seen in the transference from the
present perfect to the present progressive. Likewise, the coherence
criterion of intentionality is seen in the transference from the present
progressive to the present perfect a posteriori.

   Transcendental Phenomenology tries to say everything in the present
tense. Because of this stipulation, it has to be transcendental. Instead, if
one is willing to employ both the present progressive and the present
perfect in addition to the present tense , intentionality would have to be
an inevitable consequence in the descriptive domain. Even if the present
perfect goes along with such an artifact that it may make an uncompleted
movement completed, there should be nothing shameful insofar as we notice
this fact.

   The mechanistic philosophers and their close relatives are unequivocal in
expressing their confidence in stating what is in the present perfect mode
in the present tense. This is one extreme. They seem not to care about the
artifact latent in the present perfect. The phenomenologist seems to avoid
the trap to which the mechanistic people are vulnerable, but goes to another
extreme of transcendence. The internalist stance squarely facing the
artifact latent in the present perfect grounds the occurrence of
intentionality upon our everyday practice of languaging. Of course, as far
as literally completed movement is concerned, there should be nothing wrong
with the accepted practice of empirical sciences in general or physics in
particular. In the latter, however, the problem would arise if an
uncompleted movement comes to be addressed. The internalist stance wants to
address such an uncompleted movement as paying the legitimate price
admitting that the present perfect, though inevitable, is merely a
linguistic artifact. How about that?


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