[time 1100] Re: [time 1093] Re: [time 1086] intensities

Hitoshi Kitada (hitoshi@kitada.com)
Wed, 8 Dec 1999 20:47:40 +0900

Dear Koichiro and all,

Koichiro Matsuno <kmatsuno@vos.nagaokaut.ac.jp> wrote:

Subject: [time 1093] Re: [time 1092] Re: [time 1091] Re: [time 1089] Re: [time
1086] intensities

> Dear Hitoshi an All:
> On 6 Dec 1999, Hitoshi Kitada <hitoshi@kitada.com> wrote:
> >So you think "clocking" is a consequence of linguistic artifact to
> >have a better or more beautiful expression of things?
> Rather, I should say that "clocking" must be the best of all the
> artifacts that must be inevitable anyhow so long as we admit ourselves to be
> the speaking animals.

My stance is that clocking is not restricted to "speaking animals" nor to living
things we perceive so usually. My thought is seen in Lance's [time 734] entitled
"Time as philosophical problem (re [time 724])":

> In Hitoshi's first statements on the subject of Local Times one of the
> things that attracted my attention (as a philosopher) was his comment that
> the problem of time in contemporary physics is essentially a philosophical
> problem, not a physical or mathematical problem. Matti's comment here
> perfectly illustrates the validity of Hitoshi's assertion about the nature
> of the problem of time. What is at issue is really how we understand the
> fundamental nature of time. In our joint article in Apeiron, Hitoshi and I
> were completely explicit about the fact that our position was in opposition
> to the conventional understanding. Here is what we wrote:
> "...the proper clock is the local system itself,
> and it is a necessary manifestation of that local system.
> In this sense, "clocking" is the natural activity of any
> local system. It follows from this that to be an existing
> thing in the world necessarily involves clocking, without
> which there is no interaction. In these respects, our position
> is in complete opposition to the conventional understanding
> of time measurement, where time is given a
> priori and the measurement of time by clocks is viewed as
> an incidental activity of intelligent observers. Contrary to
> the conventional understanding, our view is that all beings
> are engaged in measuring and observing, and the activities
> of measuring and observing are not incidental, but
> pertain to the essence of all interactions. If we are permitted
> to express it somewhat boldly, we have turned things
> completely around: It is not that things exist and their
> duration is incidentally expressed by clocks. According to
> our formulation, clocks exist and their operation is necessarily
> expressed by duration."
> (to which we might have added, Time, as measured or counted duration, is
> what results when certain local systems or certain sets of interactions are
> chosen as the standard in terms of which other durations are described,
> much as monetary value comes into existence when one commodity is chosen as
> the unit in terms of which the exchange relations of other commodities are
> expressed.)

In the point that we do not communicate with things other than humans usually,
your restriction with a reservation "Rather, I should say" may be correct. And I
see some ideas common to ours seeing your statement referred to by Stephen in
[time 1005]:

> At the least, time is upon the
> relational activity between a clock of whatever sort and another agency
> which reads it as such.

I feel however a stress on humans' linguistic activities might limit our

> It can bridge the chasm between the present perfect
> and the present progressive.

As a cause that led humans to find the notion of time, the distinction between
the present perfect and the present progressive would be a correct understanding
of humans' history.

> >Could you explain "the transcendental sense of Husserl" in
> >relation with your statement "It [clocking] may be intentional,
> >but not in the transcendental sense of Husserl." I could not
> >exact meaning here.
> Consider, for instance, the statement "The gazelle makes a quick turn in
> order to escape from the hunting panther." The phenomenologist including
> Husserl would say that the gazelle is intentional in the sense that the turn
> it makes is not a consequence of deductive inference on the part of the
> gazelle. It could make other turn. That is the noninference criterion of
> intentionality. Also, the gazelle has to do such skillful turns frequently
> in order to survive for some time. That is the coherence criterion of
> intentionality. The hallmark of Husserlian Phenomenology is that both the
> noninference and the coherence criterion are non-empirical. These two
> criteria are transcendental. It is the phenomenologist, instead of the
> gazelle, who is responsible for making such transcendental statements. This
> aspect of assuming the transcendental attitude is what most empirical
> scientists do not like to accept.
> In contrast, if one distinguishes between "is making a quick turn" and
> "has made a quick turn", the noninference criterion of intentionality which
> the phenomenologist perceives will be seen in the transference from the
> present perfect to the present progressive. Likewise, the coherence
> criterion of intentionality is seen in the transference from the present
> progressive to the present perfect a posteriori.
> Transcendental Phenomenology tries to say everything in the present
> tense. Because of this stipulation, it has to be transcendental. Instead, if
> one is willing to employ both the present progressive and the present
> perfect in addition to the present tense , intentionality would have to be
> an inevitable consequence in the descriptive domain. Even if the present
> perfect goes along with such an artifact that it may make an uncompleted
> movement completed, there should be nothing shameful insofar as we notice
> this fact.
> The mechanistic philosophers and their close relatives are unequivocal in
> expressing their confidence in stating what is in the present perfect mode
> in the present tense. This is one extreme. They seem not to care about the
> artifact latent in the present perfect. The phenomenologist seems to avoid
> the trap to which the mechanistic people are vulnerable, but goes to another
> extreme of transcendence. The internalist stance squarely facing the
> artifact latent in the present perfect grounds the occurrence of
> intentionality upon our everyday practice of languaging. Of course, as far
> as literally completed movement is concerned, there should be nothing wrong
> with the accepted practice of empirical sciences in general or physics in
> particular. In the latter, however, the problem would arise if an
> uncompleted movement comes to be addressed. The internalist stance wants to
> address such an uncompleted movement as paying the legitimate price
> admitting that the present perfect, though inevitable, is merely a
> linguistic artifact. How about that?

This may be a nice summary of humans' contentions. I personally may have a wish
to widen the sight to see every entity existing in the universe would have the
ability to make clocking of its own. As I mentioned in [time 1033] in reply to
Tito, I think life is not the one usually conceived in our traditional but vague
thought. It might have a characterization that is available in the context of
local systems.

Best wishes,

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