[time 189] Re: [time 188] one more addition to Re: Prugovecki's time

Stephen P. King (stephenk1@home.com)
Tue, 06 Apr 1999 10:58:45 -0400

Dear Hitoshi,

        Perhaps we are both tired. :) I will wait to go over my ideas of QM
gravity when we both have Eddington's paper on Weyl in hand. I again
agree with what you are saying below. We are not converging here, it is
obvious that I am just making noise. :(

Hitoshi Kitada wrote:
> Dear Stephen,
> I try to clarify my position.
> >From the conlusion, I agree that gravitaion will be given a QM formalism, but
> it will be at the last step of my approach.
> What I am trying to understand is the machinery or structure of our
> recognition with the expectation that it will clarify physical aspect of
> gravity. In this point, I think your approach has the same goal, or you will
> get to it at least as some byproducts. However, I think it necessary to
> understand the fundamental structure of observation first.

        I am known to be impatient... :)
> I feel you seem to try to get at once the QM theory of gravity, seeing that
> you are interested in Weyl's approach. On the other hand, seeing that you seem
> to think that interactions as communications are important, Weyl's approach
> looks to me slightly different from what you want to understand in terms of
> information theoretic approach. I do not see what approach you try to take
> toward QG.

        It is the same as your in the sense of equivalence. Note that how we
think of a theory is also subject to the axioms of LS theory, and our
minds are independent LSs. :)

> Best wishes,
> Hitoshi
        Can we look at what I wrote more carefully? How does one think of the
observations occuring between subLSs when one is only observing the
outside of that LS. Perhaps I am asking a question similar to Ben's:

> Doesn't it violate common sense in some way -- i.e. if particles in distant
> locations have interacted before, they may be correlated in their patterns of
> movement even when you subtract off the center of mass.
>You are right:

>The particles are correlated in their patterns of "movement." But it is so,
>_as far as_ they are considered to "move" according to the "time" of the
>system to which the particles belong. In other words, the reference frame of
>the "movement" is the space-time of the system. The "before" in the above
>quotation of your opinion should thus be understood the "before" measured in
>the frame of this "time" of the system. Namely space-time is proper to each
>local system. This is the first point.

        Do we say that there is a spacetime proper to *each* LS and,
symmetrically, an LS proper to each spacetime? This is another way of
saying that for every "subject" there is an "object" and for every
"object" there is a "subject".

>Second, here is another implicit assumption. The particles' "correlation"
>cannot be known unless the correlation is observed or measured. If no one
>observes the system, the correlation cannot be known, or is forgotten. The
>forgotten correlation cannot be traced further. One needs to start to measure
>other systems similar to that one, in order to reproduce the observation. In this
>sense, the word "observation" has an implicit assumption behind it that the
>_different_ observations could be identified if one's memory tells one that
>the situation looks the same as before ("before" in the time coordinate of the
>one's, and "one" can be a set of observers, e.g., a set of modern physicists,
>that has a time coordinate which might have begun in the 16th century or so
>(with Galileo Galilei and/or others?)).

        Could it be that the act of measurement/observation *is* a mapping of
correlations, like Edelman's idea that re-entrant mappings between
neuronal groups *is* consciousness? There is also the question of
"delayed choise"...

>I distinguish this difference of observations. Thus local systems have
>different Hilbert spaces as in axiom 1, even when they have common particles.

>In other words, the local system is the notion that describes the object of
>observation, that is different from time to time (time is again the time of
>the observer) and from observer to observer.

        When we say "spacetime" does this not assume, at least, that such is
what an LS observes of other LSs? I think we agree that there is more
than one spacetime since each LS's observations make up such. But if the
subject-object relation is symmetric, there is more to this that we have
covered so far. Remember that length is not an absolute invariant!
        I would like to discuss how the equivalence principle is modeled in LS
theory. By the way, Prugovecki talks about rigged Hilbert spaces on page
446. ("Gel'fand space"!). He makes a point that I believe is very
important there. I will comment on it shortly.

Onward to the Unknown,


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